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The making of modern authority centred on efforts to formalise and de-personalise power, and 
transnational orders such as the European Union have often been viewed as an extension of that project.  
As this paper argues, recent developments tell a different story.  More than a decade of crisis politics has 
seen institutions subordinated to and reshaped by individuals and the networks they form.  Locating these 
tendencies in a wider historical context, the paper argues that greater attention to informality in 
transnational governance needs to be paired with greater recognition of the normative questions it raises.  
Just as a separation between rulers and the offices of rule was central to the making of modern legal and 
political structures, the weakening of that separation creates legitimacy problems for contemporary 
authorities both national and supranational.  Rather than acclaimed as flexible problem-solving, the step 
back from institutions should be viewed as a challenge to accountable rule. 
 
 





International organisations are conventionally portrayed as the sphere of law, institutions, and 
anonymous bureaucracy.1  Power, goes the thought, has been abstracted from individuals and 
embedded in impersonal frameworks, leading to an approximation of the rule of rules.  In an age 
of crisis decision-making, can such a perspective still be maintained? 
Today’s era of crisis politics forces us to reckon with the de-institutionalisation of power 
beyond the state.  Fast-moving, challenging circumstances encourage agents to sidestep chains 
of command, pointing to exceptional circumstances as reason to depart from accepted script.  
While deviations of a constitutional kind are a well-recognised feature of emergency governing, 
e.g. in the form of executive dominance, less discussed are those at the level of institutions, as 
arrangements based on informality arise.  Such dynamics can be observed in the recent 
experiences of the European Union (EU), the most consolidated of transnational orders, as its 
leaders have grappled with a succession of challenges centred on finance, migration and health.   
 
1 For comments on the text I thank Lea Ypi, the Journal’s referees, and the editors.  The article was conceived 
during a Humboldt Stiftung fellowship at the Hertie School of Berlin, and finalized during a fellowship at The 
New Institute in Hamburg. 
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This paper develops an account of authority beyond the state that captures these 
tendencies and why they matter.  Against the assumptions of institutionalist perspectives in IR 
and EU studies, it shows how informalisation and personalisation prosper in this context and 
come to the fore in hard times.  A precarious achievement at the best of times, institutions and 
their procedures tend to soften quickly when the politics of emergency takes hold.  Against the 
grain of a specialist literature that acknowledges and engages with these patterns, the paper urges 
more attention to the normative costs.  Scholars of informal governance stress its functional 
benefits, be it in solving coordination problems or managing power shifts (Vabulas & Snidal 
2013; Abbott & Faude 2020).  The flexibility of informality is said to make it ‘especially valuable 
during crises when leaders must move quickly’ (Vabulas & Snidal 2013: 211).  As this paper 
argues, more attention should be paid to what these arrangements imply for the accountability, 
contestability, and legitimacy of authority (cf. Roger 2020, p.213).  Circumventing institutions 
can aid actor speed and discretion, but for the same reason it can shade into arbitrary rule. 
The paper’s point of departure is a contrast: the wider development of modern political 
authority as a project of institutionalising power.  As the first section shows, by revisiting its 
history we can retrieve some of the normative issues at stake.  Drawing on the work of Gianfranco 
Poggi (1990), the text shows how the making of the state involved the pursuit of a separation 
between the persons who ruled and the offices of rule.  It entailed abstracting from the 
particularities of the former – their motivations, opinions and interpersonal ties – so as to establish 
a framework that could shape and constrain them.  Institutions had to be made, and their 
construction supported a project of rationalising the exercise of rule. 
Transnational authority structures, the second section observes, tend to be viewed as an 
extension of this.  In the political science of transnational orders, the centrality of institutional 
dynamics has tended to be assumed (e.g. Garrett and Tsebelis 2001).  Yet there are good reasons 
to see things differently.  Structural features of the transnational realm create distinct possibilities 
for the de-institutionalisation of power, ones likely to be actualised in crisis moments.  The 
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section outlines the basis of an alternative perspective, combining recent IR scholarship on 
informal arrangements (Roger 2020; Westerwinter, Abbott and Biersteker 2021; Mérand 2021) 
with work on transnational emergency politics that highlights exceptional methods and the 
legitimacy questions they raise (Auer and Scicluna 2021; Kreuder-Sonnen 2019; White 2019; 
Kreuder-Sonnen and White 2021; Heupel et al. 2021).   
The paper’s third, empirical section examines what the deinstitutionalisation of power 
means in practice.  In the contemporary EU, a period of crisis politics has seen institutions 
subordinated to and remade by individuals and the networks they form.  In addition to the use of 
informal forums of decision-making, one can observe changes in the established sites of 
supranational authority.  Looking at the Commission and European Central Bank (ECB), the 
section highlights the concentration of power in individuals, such that key decisions are taken by 
the few; the collaboration of leaders across institutional boundaries, such that ties of trust 
override the formal definition of roles; and a reliance on personalised authority, such that 
emphasis falls on personal judgement, expertise and discretion.  As the paper argues, these 
tendencies create a template liable to recur, in the EU and transnational governance more widely.  
The final section conveys why this matters.  While the informalisation of power tends to 
be acclaimed as improving the effectiveness of rule, and personalisation as aiding its legibility, 
things look more challenging from the perspective of political thought.  By weakening the 
separation between rulers and offices that was central to modern legitimacy, these tendencies 
weaken power’s accountability and the facility to contest it at the level of ideas.  They ease the 
passage of controversial measures in the guise of crisis response.  They also make it harder for 
the polity to retain public acceptance despite the failings of particular officials.  Institutions that 
can withstand the repercussions of emergencies are a neglected precondition of any desirable 
transnational consolidation, and to reflect on their foundations is ultimately to revisit some basic 




Modern Authority and the Institutionalisation of Power   
 
At least since Max Weber, the making of modern authority has been grasped by state theorists as 
the rise of rules, institutions and procedures.  IR’s story of state-formation has tended to focus on 
units in interaction – their relative power, claims to non-interference, and the properties of the 
Westphalian system (e.g. Waltz 1979).  The history of domestic change underpinning these 
developments has always received less attention (for critical discussion: Osiander 2007, ch. 1).  
But at the core of the state-building process in Europe was a project of separating political power 
from the persons able to wield it at a given moment – what Weber called the ‘general tendency 
to impersonality, the obligation to conform to abstract norms’ (Weber 1968 [1922]: 294).2  
Whereas the feudal orders of late-medieval Europe were based mainly on informal and personal 
ties, later political forms sought to abstract from these.   
It is important to begin by tracing these changes – first, because they highlight that the 
institutionalisation of power was historically tied to state-formation, hence not necessarily to be 
expected in non-state contexts, and second, because they indicate some of the normative issues 
at stake, ones relevant to the assessment of contemporary trends.  Engaging with the scholarship 
on these changes also yields categories of analysis that can be transposed to the supra-state 
setting.  
The transformation of power in early-modern Europe was on the one hand a phenomenon 
of changing political language.  In a classic study, Ernst Kantorowicz famously documented the 
conceptualisation of authority as it evolved in the medieval period.  From the late 1100s, he 
observed, discourse in England and France increasingly came to distinguish the king, as an 
individual, from the ‘idea of an impersonal crown’ (Kantorowicz 1957: 347).  The latter was 
 
2 Earlier analysis of the idea of the impersonal state can be found e.g. in Bluntschli’s Lehre vom Modernen Staat 
(1875). 
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something that would outlive the king, and to which the king had certain responsibilities.  He 
would start to be viewed as its guardian, expressed by the early 1400s in an oath sworn at the 
point of coronation (Kantorowicz 1957: 358).  Such distinctions were inspired in part by the 
ecclesiastical model, where it was already customary to adopt the corporative view, abstracting 
from tangible individuals to evoke a larger, enduring collective (Kantorowicz 1957: 194, 209).3  
In the image of the Church, monarchy started to be experienced as an institution. 
Such distinctions anticipated the later language of statehood.  In the medieval period such 
terms as status, stato and etat still carried personal connotations.  They referred to the attributes 
of individuals in their specificity, resulting from their lineage and their prowess in battle – 
something closer to the ‘status’ of a ruler.  In Harvey Mansfield’s words, in this period ‘the Latin 
status does not stand alone, but requires some accompanying word or phrase to specify whose 
status’ (Mansfield 1983: 851).  One could write of status regalis – something like ‘the king’s 
majesty’ – but not of status as an independent arrangement.  Only from the 1400s did the term 
acquire more abstract connotations – e.g. status regni, the ‘state of the realm’, evoking a 
territorial space – and with it the potential to be detached from the figure of the prince (Mager 
1968: 83; cf. Shennan 1974: 25).4  A depersonalised conception of political authority, and with 
it the capacity to speak of such abstractions as ‘the state’ without adjectives, and of citizens rather 
than subjects, arguably found its clearest expression in Renaissance republican thought (Skinner 
2009).  It would be refined in key texts of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, 
notably Bodin’s Six Books of the Commonwealth and Hobbes’ Leviathan. 
The transformation of power was equally a matter of changing practices.  Medieval 
monarchies were for the most part maintained on relations of interpersonal trust and loyalty.  The 
king surrounded himself by favoured associates and relied on the networks of his household to 
 
3 Behind emerging ideas of the ‘King’s two bodies’ (the ‘king body natural’ and the ‘king body politic’) were 
religious notions of Christ’s two bodies (Kantorowicz 1957: 199). 
4 Shennan (1974: 25) sees persisting into the early sixteenth century ‘the assumption that the existence of the state 
depended on the prior existence of the prince, a patrimonial, dynastic outlook’. 
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rule.  Coordination between agents in the feudal system was achieved by oaths of allegiance and 
related rituals; a vassal paid ‘homage’ to his lord, indicating that he was his lord’s man (homme).  
These were first and foremost ties between determinate individuals (Poggi 1990: 38).  By 
contrast, what started to emerge in the early-modern period were less personalised modes of rule.  
Impersonal ‘oaths of office’ started to replace oaths of allegiance to a particular lord 
(Kantorowicz 1957: 354).  Early bureaucracies began to take shape, differentiated in their 
purposes, regulated by procedures such as auditing, and staffed by those chosen mainly for their 
ability (Shennan 1974: 70).  Such enduring entities could be tasked indefinitely with managing 
the affairs of the ‘state’, outliving the individuals that composed them.   
Both then in the language and symbolism of political authority, and in the way decisions 
were taken, one can observe moves towards impersonal forms.  The making of the modern state 
was the making of an abstraction: a political order detachable in some measure from the identities 
and inclinations of individuals.  IR scholarship, insofar as it engages with the history of state-
building, has tended to emphasise centre-formation and technological change (see notably Spruyt 
1994).  But it was the abstraction of power from determinate individuals that was arguably the 
decisive novelty – the basis of efforts to systematise rule, and also to grasp it as a system.  It was, 
on one level, the making of the distinction between offices and persons.  Officials could represent 
the state, but did not embody it.  Offices and the roles attached could be transferred from one 
individual to another, even left vacant for a while.  On another level, it was the making of an 
order expected to transcend idiosyncratic or sectoral preferences: to be impersonal in the sense 
of ruling for non-personal ends, responsive to generalisable priorities rather than arbitrary whim 
(Shennan 1974: 28ff; cf. Mansfield 1983: 852; for a rare engagement from an IR perspective: 
Osiander 2007: 8-10). 
These tendencies were a combination of practical innovations, imperfectly realised, with 
normative ideals that reached beyond them.  Political and constitutional thought has developed 
and embroidered them in countless ways, from defences of the Rechtsstaat to accounts of the 
 7 
substitution of the ‘rule of men’ with the ‘rule of law’ (Bobbio 1987, ch. 7; cf. Eulau 1942).   The 
rise of modern legal systems, centred on norms of general application, have been a natural focus, 
but analogous processes have been discerned in contexts beyond the legal field.  The embedding 
of leadership in political parties, technocratic agencies and other forms of organisation are all 
variants of the same wider movement towards abstraction.   
In his landmark account of the making of the modern state, Gianfranco Poggi summarises 
the transformation of early-modern political power as a process of institutionalisation (Poggi 
1990: 18ff., 33ff.,75ff.; cf. Popitz 1986).  It encompassed, he suggests, three parallel tendencies.  
One was the ‘depersonalisation’ of power, whereby individual identities and interpersonal ties 
became less significant on the side of both rulers and ruled.  The second was the ‘formalisation’ 
of power, whereby its exercise came to be standardised through laws, rules and procedures.  The 
third was the ‘integration’ of power into a greater social whole, whether by reference to ideas of 
nationhood or other principles of representation.  The state, he suggested, embodied these 
tendences ‘to a high degree’ (Poggi 1990: 33), but they expressed a transformation of authority 
more generally.  As we shall see, these categories hold considerable potential for the analysis of 
politics beyond the state. 
The institutionalisation of power was something distinct from its democratisation.  The 
reordering of early-modern rule proceeded for some time without widespread demands that it 
accommodate popular will.  Only with the emergence of the legislature as the primary source of 
law, and with parties as collective agents seeking to control it, did institutionalised rule start to 
intersect with the democratic (Bobbio 1987: 143).  But even if institutionalisation was distinct in 
this sense, it was always a process with normative weight.  Abstracting power from persons and 
informal ties was a necessary condition of making it more accountable.  Only then could it be 
scrutinised from without and contested at the level of general principle.  Through driven by a 




Transnational Authority as Extending the Institutionalisation Process? 
 
How do transnational authority structures relate to the above-mentioned dimensions of 
institutionalisation?  The third of Poggi’s categories – the integration of power into a social whole 
– has generally been considered weak.  There is no transnational demos, it is said – no cross-
border community to which supranational authority can meaningfully appeal.  Authority in this 
context is technocratic authority, at least in its primary features.  Given these points are well-
rehearsed, we shall postpone further discussion of integration to the final section.  But the other 
two elements of institutionalisation in this scheme – the depersonalisation and formalisation of 
power – are widely assumed to be very present in transnational contexts.  As I want to argue here 
with reference to the EU, the making of transnational authority has generally been seen as 
consolidating and extending the institutionalisation of power – a reading which in key respects 
is misleading. 
Sometimes fondly, sometimes disparagingly, the EU has been seen since its inception as 
the archetype of power detached from individuals and their confidants.  By its admirers, it has 
been celebrated since the days of Walter Hallstein as a community of law – as a rule-bound order, 
even if lightly democratic.  The appeal of European integration in the post-War period lay in its 
promise to constrain the wayward exercise of executive power (Müller 2011).  The lesson taken 
by many from the experience of fascism was that the regularisation of power was a precarious 
achievement, liable to be reversed by the appearance of charismatic leaders pursuing 
authoritarian rule.  Precisely because the project of formalising and depersonalising power was 
incomplete and threatened, the role of transnational structures was to consolidate it.  
Equally, by their detractors, transnational structures have been criticised as 
depersonalising and formalising power to an excessive degree.  They have been caricatured as 
‘faceless’ bureaucracies, overly devoted to rules and procedures, and with an exaggerated fear of 
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political agency.  Such critiques have become prominent in the characterisation of the EU in 
recent decades, in the age of Brexit and public euro-scepticism (Lacey 2017:2).  They portray the 
EU as a kind of reductio ad absurdum – the culmination of the modern project of 
institutionalising power, taken to its logical extreme. 
Less normatively, accounts of how transnational structures function have tended to 
internalise the idea that they are a continuation of the formalisation and depersonalisation of 
power.  When scholars take aim at IR-realism’s image of an anarchic international order, it is 
generally by casting the transnational sphere as a world of institutions and procedures.  This is 
true of scholarship on international organisations generally (e.g. Barnett and Finnemore 2004), 
and of that on the EU specifically.  Varieties of ‘institutionalism’ are the backbone of research in 
this field, based on the view that the EU is ‘without question the most densely institutionalised 
international organisation in the world’ (Pollack 2018: 108).  Adopting an ontology of politics 
centred on institutions both national and supranational, these accounts embrace the view that the 
Union is best understood in terms of the interplay of corporate forms, relegating to a subordinate 
role such factors as the leadership of individuals, the networks surrounding them, and the material 
and ideological forces to which these are exposed (for critical overviews: Schmidt 2018; Jenson 
& Mérand 2010).5  Treating the EU as an extension of the institutionalisation process, they are 
predisposed to see its actions in these terms. 
Without discounting the value of institutionalist perspectives, one may note some 
important limitations.  To begin with, such accounts take as their empirical starting-point what 
was always an ideal, only ever approximated.  Just how far modern political power was ever truly 
depersonalised and formalised in any context, including the state, is debatable.  Weber tends to 
be read as treating charisma as a pre-democratic logic, supplanted by bureaucratic rationality, but 
there can be little doubt that it lingered in modern politics.  Marxists are amongst those who have 
 
5 These points apply particularly to scholarship inspired by rational-choice, formal and constructivist 
institutionalism; some forms of sociological institutionalism adopt a broader ontology (Jenson & Mérand 2010). 
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argued that concepts such as the state can be misleading in their abstraction from social power, 
given powerful interests and ideologies tend to skew the exercise of rule in favour of some 
(Mansfield 1983).  In the most sceptical line of reasoning, institutions are little more than a cover 
for the exercise of power by individuals and the classes they represent.  One does not need to 
accept this strong version of the thesis to observe that the distinction between rulers and the 
offices of rule is a precarious one, and that there may be settings where it is especially vulnerable. 
One should note moreover that several global changes in contemporary societies run 
counter to the institutionalisation of power.  Poggi writes of ‘a tendency for contemporary state 
structures to regress toward political arrangements similar to those preceding the emergence or 
the maturity of the state’ (Poggi 1990: 184), and this general observation applies well to the 
features in question.  Partly this stems from changes in the media environment, as emphasised in 
an extensive contemporary literature on personalisation (e.g. McAllister 2007; Garzia 2014).  
Important also to observe is that the depersonalisation and formalisation of modern politics, to 
the extent it was achieved, corresponded to the demilitarisation of societies.  The concentration 
of power at the top of the feudal pyramid had always in part been an artefact of preparations for 
war, while the personal authority associated with prowess (courage, valour) tended to be won on 
the battlefield (Poggi 1990: 35).  These were modes of rule oriented to crisis settings.  Only when 
politics was reoriented to a predominantly peacetime footing, with the Westphalian order and 
successive arrangements, could other logics decisively emerge.  
While open military engagements remain rare in today’s Europe, an orientation to 
security is not.  The emergence of Covid-19 has amplified this, but there is a longer trend in play.  
Recent decades have seen the reappearance in peacetime of emergency modes of governing and 
the securitising logic that underpins them (Calhoun 2004).  Emergency rule is a paradigm with a 
variety of sources today: the material pressures associated with finance capitalism and social 
acceleration, the influence of powerful interests aiming to consolidate preferred policy regimes 
under conditions that challenge them, and changes within executive power itself, notably leaders 
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searching for new ways to secure their authority with mass publics (Scheuerman 2004; White 
2019).  Important for our purposes is that this is a mode of rule that fosters irregular forms of 
decision-making and individual discretion.   
If these are general tendencies in contemporary politics, one can assume they will make 
themselves felt in the transnational setting.  Recent research suggests emergency modes of 
government are now a feature of both supranational and intergovernmental authority, offering 
much opportunity for informality and personalisation (for a ‘grammar’ of IO exceptionalism: 
Kreuder-Sonnen 2019: 32ff; cf. Kreuder-Sonnen and White 2021; White 2015a, 2015b).  What 
is more, when such tendencies unfold, their impact will be more problematic.  Transnational 
orders tend to be advocated as communities of law and procedure, meaning that practices at odds 
with this weaken their rationale.  Moreover, the link is weaker in the transnational sphere between 
authority and electoral accountability.  In a conventional presidential system, emergency 
situations encourage the personalisation and centralisation power, but for some this is acceptable 
insofar as the president must present themselves to an electorate (Posner and Vermeule 2011).  
At the transnational level, when politics takes place outside institutions constrained by the law, 
it tends to be by actors over whom voters have little control.  The decisions they take can also be 
especially hard to undo, given the weakness of judicial review and the many veto players 
involved.  The normalisation of emergency measures becomes a likely prospect, such that the 
effects of exceptionalism are long-lasting (Kreuder-Sonnen 2019: 43ff). 
Finally and most importantly, the transnational sphere offers its own additional 
possibilities for the de-institutionalisation of power.  To the extent that tendencies towards 
depersonalisation and formalisation were successfully fostered in the modern state, they were 
supported by the development of binding constitutional arrangements.  The functioning of 
institutions and the relations between them had to be codified, and this backed by meaningful 
sanctions.  The ideal of sovereignty and its attendant hierarchies encouraged this process of 
codification (Eulau 1942).  While some argued this process was unavoidably incomplete (Schmitt 
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2005), these constitutional structures nonetheless put obstacles in the way of unchecked personal 
discretion.  So too did the emergence of corporate forms of agency such as the political party, 
defining themselves by collective goals and tying their leaders to an organisation (Bobbio 1987: 
51ff.).  These features have always been less developed transnationally.  Though the workings 
of international organisations have been circumscribed by conventions of practice and statements 
of principle, these constraints have been weakly undergirded by sanctions for their breach and 
typically made conditional on their capacity to serve particular policy commitments (Isiksel 
2016).  When emergency powers are pursued in international organisations, it is generally in a 
manner that has not been codified in advance, and by actors who lack sovereign authority 
(Kreuder-Sonnen 2019: 38; Kreuder-Sonnen 2021; White 2015a).  They must therefore cajole 
others into supporting their actions, with all the reliance on informal networks this is likely to 
entail. 
These features present a challenge to the tendencies towards de-personalisation and 
formalisation highlighted by Poggi.  One can expect them to be actualised in various forms.  One 
will be informal IOs that lack much in the way of operating procedures to begin with, as IR 
scholars have started to observe (Vabulas and Snidal 2013).  Entities such as the G20 arguably 
exist to give national leaders a context in which to make policy without the procedural constraints 
of domestic politics (Roger 2020).  Equally, one can expect irregular practices within and around 
ostensibly more formal supranational structures (Westerwinter, Abbott and Biersteker 2021; 
Stone 2013; Kleine 2013).  To get the measure of what these tendencies to informalisation and 
personalisation entail, and as the basis for their critical appraisal, it is worth examining them 
more closely in the context arguably least hospitable to them, yet dense with decision-making 
power: the EU.   
 
 
De-institutionalisation in practice: emergency rule in the EU 
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There is a long-standing tradition in EU scholarship of narrating EU politics in terms of the 
changing fortunes of its leading institutions.  This focus has been evident as authors take stock 
of the Union’s transformations since the early 2010s, charting the relative gains of supranational 
and intergovernmental institutions (e.g. Bauer and Becker 2014; Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 
2015).  One reason such accounts are valuable is that they connect current affairs to historical 
processes and wider explanatory theories.  A focus on institutional dynamics helps avoid casting 
episodes of high drama as worlds unto themselves.  Yet as I want to suggest in this section, much 
that has happened in the EU’s recent history is difficult to grasp in these terms.  As the accounts 
of participants, journalists and some scholars suggest, crucial aspects of the handling of the 
Eurozone crisis, migration politics and Covid-19 do not map easily onto an institutional grid.  
One sees actions that cut across institutional boundaries and blur them, and which divide 
institutions from within, bringing individual discretion to the fore.  What these actions amount 
to, I suggest, are de-institutionalisation.6 
Keeping to Poggi’s categories, we are interested in patterns at odds with the formalisation 
and de-personalisation of power.  Starting with the former, first to note is the reliance on informal 
forums of policy-making in contemporary EU decision-making.  The ‘Eurogroup’ is one example 
– an unofficial entity rather than an institution as such, bringing together national finance 
ministers and Commission representatives.  It was central to efforts to manage the Euro crisis in 
the 2010s, and was also relied on to initiate the EU’s response to Covid-19 in spring 2020.7  Its 
existence indicates the importance of informal ties, and has been celebrated by participants 
exactly for its absence of codified procedures.8  With no rules by which weaker members might 
 
6 ‘Deinstitutionalisation’ has been used before in EU studies, but with a focus on lower-level networks of influence 
around the Commission: Benz 2003: 101.   
7 The Eurogroup press release of 9th April 2020 indicates the range of issues its participants discussed in the 





seek to hold their ground, e.g. by threatening a veto, pressure is more readily applied 
(Transparency International 2019: 5).  As a recent study puts it, European economic governance 
relies on informal arrangements ‘as it remains in the interest of powerful countries to exert power 
behind the curtain’ (Abels 2019: 532).  While the Eurogroup has been the standout informal 
forum of the EU-sphere in recent years, until recently the European Council played a similar role.  
Summits between heads of state were a way to pursue crisis decision-making unencumbered by 
the constraints of the Community method (White 2019: 56-60), a practice that retained its 
informal character until brought into the EU framework with the Lisbon Treaty.  
What is notable in the EU context is how informal structures of this kind are paired with 
informal practices in and around the established sites of supranational power.  A pattern recorded 
in both the ECB and the Commission in this period has been the ad hoc concentration of power 
in individuals, as bureaucratic hierarchies are circumvented in the name of crisis response.  At 
the ECB, decision-making at key moments has involved a powerful individual (Draghi, Trichet) 
surrounded by a small circle of trusted aides, governing by informality and discretion (Verdun 
2017).  A persistent observation of those close to Draghi was that he operated in a highly 
centralised fashion, running affairs through a ‘kitchen cabinet’.  Members of the ECB’s 
Governing Council have spoken of informal ‘meetings before meetings’ and ‘Draghi’s practice 
of preparing big decisions with a close circle of advisers and involving the ECB Governing 
Council only late in the process.’9  Likewise at the Commission during Covid-19, it has been said 
by close observers that ‘decisions are made too fast and in a narrow circle’.10  In the context of 
criticisms of the Commission’s vaccine procurement, President Von der Leyen was said to 
employ a ‘silo’ style of management that excludes commissioners and senior officials in favour 




10 https://www.ft.com/content/417e089b-31af-4950-949e-3ee1986f47ce.  
11 https://www.ft.com/content/417e089b-31af-4950-949e-3ee1986f47ce; see also https://ft.com/content/5062a436-
84d1-458a-8068-58468903b85c on ‘reluctance to communicate beyond a narrow group of advisers’. 
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pandemic,12 and are also consistent with research on the Commission during the economic 
upheavals of the 2010s (Mérand 2021: 16).  While systematic studies of power-concentration in 
this context are few, one may note also the small body of EU scholarship that identifies 
tendencies towards ‘presidentialisation’ in the supranational sphere, accelerated in an emergency 
context (Becker, Bauer, Connolly and Kassim 2016). 
This concentration of power has tended to be coupled in the EU with a different kind of 
informality – the collaboration of leaders across institutional boundaries.  In the name of solving 
immediate problems, those formally tied to different institutions have collaborated in ad hoc 
ways.  The activities of the eurozone Troika, which brought together figures associated with the 
ECB, Commission and IMF to oversee the conditions for emergency lending, are the clearest 
example.  Internal evaluations of the Troika suggest a pattern of individuals and groups 
substituting institutional procedure with improvised collaboration13 (cf. Henning 2017; Beach & 
Smeets 2020a, b).  Likewise, an analysis of EU migration policy after 2015 observes that 
‘collaboration was informal and flexible, enabling actors to sidestep bureaucratic hierarchies and 
to cross the intergovernmental / Community pillars’ (Beach & Smeets 2020a: 12; 2020b: 143).  
Informal networks, taskforces and other extra- and trans-institutional arrangements have become 
recurrent features of EU governance.  Individuals acquire the role of ‘fix-it’ people, redeployed 
from one area to another to reinforce the EU’s basic policies against the challenges of the 
moment.  Such formations do not map well onto institutional units, and are defined less by issue-
specific competence than the capacity of individuals to form good workings ties (Beach & Smeets 
2020a: 14-15; 2020b: 147).  Importantly, they are networks founded on interpersonal trust, and 
their centrality has corresponded to the distrust of established institutions and chains of 
 
12 In May 2020 EU officials were reported as saying von der Leyen had ‘surrounded herself with two or three 
people and is not listening to other people.’ https://www.ft.com/content/775c4db2-4e3d-426f-b937-
243f0673cc14?segmentID=09cf3415-e461-2c4a-a8cc-80acc4846679.  The report refers to her ‘over-reliance on a 
small group of trusted advisers … to lead a 32,000-strong bureaucracy.’ 
13 https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=35016. 
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command, notably around the Community Method.   They are primarily connections based on 
persons in their specificity rather than codified relations between offices.    
The centrality of trust-based networks itself amounts to a kind of personalisation of 
power,14 even when largely behind closed doors.  But it also fosters changes in the public image 
of power, involving a reliance on personalised authority.  In media commentaries, but also in 
the self-presentation of leaders, one sees an emphasis on key persons and their attributes – 
understandably, given their tendency to free themselves from bureaucratic routines.  Draghi is 
again one example, lauded for instance in 2012 by the Financial Times as ‘person of the year’,15 
and in many reports over the years as a hero for his crisis management, often as ‘Super Mario’.16  
Clearly, in part such discourse simply reflects the values of the media, keen to enliven its stories 
with figures of praise or blame.  (One is reminded of such constructions as ‘Merkozy’ and 
‘Merkron’ used to describe Franco-German cooperation in this period, serving to personalise one 
of the key dynamics of power in the Union (Schoeller 2018).)  But an emphasis on individuals 
and their qualities is also fostered by leaders themselves.  Draghi’s peers hailed him on his 
departure from the Bank as the man who ‘saved the eurozone’,17 deserving a ‘place in the 
pantheon’.18  Moreover, his self-presentation has been analysed as an instance of charismatic 
authority (Pansardi & Tortola 2019; Lokdam 2020), invoked to legitimise exceptional measures 
beyond the terms of his office.  Perhaps the most striking feature of his ‘whatever it takes’ speech 
was the reliance on personal assurance over technical detail – ‘believe me, it will be enough’.19  
Forms of authority based on personal capacity – technocratic, charismatic, or some combination 
– have also been claimed by figures at the Commission (Pansardi & Battegazzore 2018; Vauchez 
2016; White 2021).  Jean-Claude Juncker’s concept of a distinctively ‘political Commission’, 
 
14 The concept of personalisation is often used in studies of party democracy to draw a contrast with ideological 
and collectivist modes of politics: these though are not the connotations embraced here.  Personalised forms of 
decision-making are eminently compatible with ideological influences and the centrality of interpersonal networks.   
15 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8fca75b8-4535-11e2-838f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz33Tb2ilre  
16 https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50020948 
17 https://www.ft.com/content/a9d929f8-f9a2-11e9-a354-36acbbb0d9b6 ;  
18 https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/eu-grandees-send-draghi-to-euro-pantheon/ 
19 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html  
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and of himself as a distinctively ‘political president’,20 entailed his self-presentation as a powerful 
leader able to remake the meaning of his role.  Rather than a case of the individual taking his 
authority from the office, here was an individual asserting his personal authority to redefine and 
reshape what the office entailed. 
Recent EU decision-making thus displays four features relevant to our concerns: the use 
of informal forums, the concentration of power within institutions, the close cooperation of 
leaders across institutional boundaries, and a reliance on personalised authority.21  While each 
has only been sketched, the basic contours seem clear.  One sees methods that bypass formal 
procedures or take advantage of their absence, and that rely on, and in some measure celebrate, 
the unscripted capacity of individuals and their networks.  Such patterns of informalisation and 
personalisation challenge an account centred on institutional agents.  Certainly, individuals 
continue to occupy official roles and draw on the material and symbolic resources associated 
with these – de-institutionalisation describes a tendency rather than an end-state – but the exercise 
of power becomes more elastic.  In the case of national leaders, this entails taking advantage of 
the latitude traditionally afforded to executive representatives in international affairs, expressed 
with recourse to the informal forums increasingly common in global politics (Roger 2020).  In 
the case of supranational leaders, it entails policy-making irreducible to the competences 
formally conferred.  As argued by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in May 2020,22 one sees actions 
that exceed what the terms of office foresee – at least until the office is later redefined, or a new 
one is created for the purposes of accommodation.  The appearance of ‘de novo’ institutions 
(Bickerton, Hodson & Puetter 2015) in the EU sphere can be regarded as the retrospective 
 
20 Jean-Claude Juncker, ‘State of the European Union 2015’, 9 September 2015: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_15_5614. 
21 Or as Mérand 2021 (p.5) puts it when reviewing the Commission’s handling of eurozone economics in the 
2010s: ‘each of the issues was dealt with “politically”, with the commissioner [Moscovici], together with President 
Juncker, imposing his will on administrative services, deploying his continent-wide network of contacts, and 
developing a very personal communication style vis-à-vis the media and the European Parliament’ (my ital.). 
22 2 BvR 859/15 et. al., PSPP, Judgment of 5 May 2020: 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.ht
ml.  For more detailed discussion than is possible here: de Boer and van ’t Klooster 2020. 
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institutionalisation of practices that, at the moment of their initiation and greatest impact, were 
conducted outside existing structures.   
One reason these patterns of rule tend to be insufficiently discussed is that they are 
inherently hard to record.  They depart from the expected template.  The authorities in question 
tend to publicise the hoped-for outcome of these decision-making methods (crisis resolution etc.) 
rather than the methods themselves.  Informal, personalised practices are therefore difficult to 
discern (though ethnography can bring them to light: see Mérand 2021).  But a second reason 
they tend to be overlooked is conceptual.  Because they are at odds with how we have come to 
expect modern political authority to look, they tend to be discounted or treated as transitional.  
Those who acknowledge these tendencies tend to naturalise them as logical developments – as 
examples of adaptation by governing authorities to the pressures posed by events (for critical 
discussion: Kreuder-Sonnen 2016).  They are seen as episodes of experimentalism and 
collaborative problem-solving, helping sustain the EU before more regular forms are restored.  
The temptation, in other words, is to read them as signalling the incompleteness of 
institutionalisation rather than a departure from it, to be addressed once conditions permit.   
To see these as merely transitional phenomena would be optimistic though.  While the 
de-institutionalisation of power is most pronounced in periods of heightened exceptionalism, and 
some degree of regularisation can be expected thereafter, these practices leave traces that outlive 
any one episode.  Networks of interpersonal trust built in one governing context are liable to be 
redeployed in others (see e.g. Beach and Smeets 2020b).  Transgressing institutional norms, or 
exceeding their reach, is likely to be undertaken more freely once a precedent is established.  One 
of the findings of existing research on informal arrangements is that they tend to be durable: the 
actors involved aim to preserve them (Vabulas and Snidal 2020: 9).  Even if institutional formats 
ultimately emerge from these interactions, what is crucial is that – at least for a period – these 
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are beyond the reach of existing frameworks.23  Especially striking in the EU context is how the 
informality of bodies like the Eurogroup overlaps and interacts with informality in the established 
sites of supranational authority (cf. Roger 2020: 213).   One may speculate that the two rub off 
on each other, as actors familiar with the constraints of formal structures acquire a taste for 
informality that leads them to prefer such arrangements (the Eurogroup, and before it the 
European Council), while the use of these encourages informal methods in supposedly more 
formal settings.   
Likewise, personalisation tendencies can be expected to endure.  Public reputations built 
in a period of crisis management become a resource that can later be reactivated.  Like the 
prowess once displayed on the battlefield, modern leaders can earn and enhance their personal 
authority by convincing others of their aptitude in crisis resolution.  They can develop a name 
for themselves as the possessors of fire-fighting expertise, transferable from one institutional 
setting to another and irreducible to the authority of a particular office (consider Draghi’s re-
emergence in February 2021 as ‘Super Mario’ on the domestic Italian scene).  For trusted 





Though widely viewed as an extension of the modern project of institutionalisation, transnational 
integration as it has been pursued in recent years leads elsewhere.  It is more accurately seen as 
enabling new opportunities for rule that operates outside formal procedures and that relies on, 
and even celebrates, the unscripted capacity of individuals and inter-individual networks.  In this 
section I offer an evaluation of these patterns and what they imply for transnational authority. 
 
23 Note also the rotation of individuals between offices, allowing them an open-ended presence in the EU-sphere: 
see e.g. Lagarde moving from the headship of the IMF to the ECB, or Josep Borell, President of the European 
Parliament, 2004-7, and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy from 2019. 
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Such an assessment seems especially due given that, while our focus has been on the EU-
sphere, the patterns described are not unique to it.  The IMF is another ostensibly rule-bound 
setting in which informalisation and personalisation can be studied (Chwieroth 2013).  Its 
involvement in the Troika led to the same dynamics of power-concentration, cross-institutional 
collaboration, and the elevation of personal authority.  An internal IMF report of the time 
criticised a tendency for decisions to be taken informally by a small group, to the exclusion of 
other board members.24  Efforts to coordinate with the Commission and ECB in a fast-moving 
situation encouraged shortcutting the official procedures of the institution (Henning 2017: 34).  
Leading officials – Strauss-Kahn, Blanchard, Lagarde – emphasised the importance of exercising 
personal judgement and discretion in their policy-making (Clift 2018: 8; 107-9).  While these 
practices and their evolution demand closer study, there is a clear prima facie case for charting 
the de-institutionalisation of power beyond the EU.25 
In assessing the significance of the patterns in question, our focus is on the normative 
aspects.  Evidently these patterns have implications for empirical study – fields, networks and 
power elites are amongst the concepts one may adopt when the hold of institutions is in question 
– but the first goal is to clarify what is at stake.  At odds as they may be with wider norms of 
modern authority, are the patterns described necessarily unwelcome?  From some perspectives – 
well represented in the scholarship on IOs that picks up on these trends – a politics centred on 
informal and personalised decision-making has positive things to offer.  It is a good thing, either 
intrinsically or as a corrective to existing failings.  As I will argue, such readings are 
unsustainable – the de-institutionalisation of power weakens the accountability and contestability 
of authority.  But before reaching this conclusion, let us consider some of the arguments made. 
 
24 ‘The IMF and the Crises in Greece, Ireland and Portugal: An Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office’, 
8th July 2016 (https://ieo.imf.org/en/our-work/Evaluations/Completed/2016-0728-the-imf-and-the-crises-in-
greece-ireland-and-portugal), p.viii, p.18, p.47; see also G. Russell Kincaid, ‘The IMF’s Role in the Euro Area 
Crisis: What are the Lessons from the IMF’s Participation in the Troika?’, Independent Evaluation Office of the 
IMF, Background paper BP/16-02/06 (2016): 31. 
25 This aside from informal forums such as G20 already highlighted in the scholarship (Westerwinter, Abbott and 
Biersteker 2021). 
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In one line of reasoning, such forms of governing are to be endorsed because they promise 
greater effectiveness of rule.  A long-standing argument for granting significant power to key 
figures of the executive, or for allowing them to claim it in crisis moments, is that individuals are 
better able than corporate bodies to adapt to fast-changing circumstances.  Informal rule is more 
agile than that based on rules, procedures and circumscribed offices (classically: Machiavelli  
2008 / 1531, I.34-38).  Where effectiveness is the main yardstick of evaluation, constraints on 
discretion may be viewed as obstacles.  The use of informal gatherings and trust-based networks 
might be welcomed, cautiously, if it facilitates the capacity to make decisions and act – output 
legitimacy thereby substituting for the legitimacy of procedures (Scharpf 1999).   
Such a position is to be found amongst scholars of recent EU history who engage with 
the informal and improvised character of decision-making.  Some applaud what they see as the 
emergence of stronger leadership and a willingness to exercise discretion (Van Middelaar 2019).  
These readings tend to accept the claims of those involved to be acting without alternative under 
the pressure of necessity, seeing their actions therefore as more or less successful forms of 
functional adaptation.  This type of account is also well established in the IR literature on 
informal governance, the advantages of which are said to lie in its functionality and capacity to 
manage power asymmetries.  ‘States,’ it is said, ‘opt for less formality by using IIGOs when the 
advantages of lower sovereignty and negotiation costs, flexibility and speed outweigh the need 
for enforcement, commitment, consensus, and the bureaucratic centralization’ (Vabulas and 
Snidal 2013: 219; cf. Westerwinter, Abbott and Biersteker 2021: 11).  Informality and personal 
networks are said to be attractive ‘low-cost’ alternatives to more codified forms of rule (Abbott 
and Faude 2020; Alter and Raustiala 2018).  To be sure, these are explanatory rather than 
justificatory accounts, but the emphasis is on the rationality of the arrangements described. 
The informalisation of power presents some evident problems however.  It is not just that 
such arrangements are not always particularly functional (on this see Roger 2020: 205-6).  Rather, 
the more rule is enacted in informal forums or at the margins of formal institutions, the harder to 
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scrutinise and contest it becomes.  Established chains of delegation become unreliable guides to 
where power lies and how decisions are taken.  A mismatch emerges between the order ‘on paper’ 
and how it is enacted in practice.  In his study of authoritarian rule, Ernst Fraenkel detailed the 
difficulties arising when formal rules co-exist with informal methods.  The former present an 
image of procedural order belied by recourse to the latter.  A ‘normative state’, shaped around 
laws and procedures and the basis of the order’s legitimacy, comes to be undermined by a 
‘prerogative state’ whose agents are willing to override them.  His term to describe this was the 
‘dual state’ (Fraenkel 1941 / 2017), and it was objectionable both due to its susceptibility to 
arbitrary rule and because the outward appearance of order concealed this. 
To endorse the informalisation of power as an effective way to govern can also be to 
depoliticise the choices that get made.  If it is believed that decisions are taken under the 
determining pressure of ‘events’, perhaps it matters little in principle who takes them and how.26  
All reasonable agents could be expected to pursue largely the same goals, and they would be 
distinguished from each other only in their competence in delivery.  But if one accepts that 
politics, even in emergency moments, is never simply about problem-solving but entails choices 
between competing problem-definitions, values and interests – that it is politics, in other words, 
and not just crisis ‘management’ – then it matters greatly how decisions are arrived at.  To act in 
an emergency is to make decisions about which parts of the status quo are to be protected or 
discarded.  As work on transnational exceptionalism has highlighted, there are always competing 
goals to be evaluated even in crisis decision-making, ones hard to revisit after the fact (Kreuder-
Sonnen 2016; 2019: esp. 43ff; see also Heupel et al. 2021).  The de-institutionalisation of rule 
obscures the basis on which these decisions are taken.27  Moreover, as episodes of emergency 
politics recur, ever more spheres of decision-making acquire this character.    
 
26 It may matter on pragmatic grounds, shaping the capacity to gain popular consent for the measures enacted. 
27 As Mérand 2021 correctly notes, officials exercising such discretion are engaged in ‘political work’ – work that 
can be put to progressive as well as regressive ends (see pp.105ff.), but always in ways difficult for a wider public 
to scrutinise.   
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One should resist the thought that some situations demand informal methods – that they 
can be governed in no other way.  Defenders of exceptionalism may see a necessary trade-off in 
hard times between procedures and effective rule.  Emergencies demand speed and discretion, 
they will say, and the costs to transparency must be accepted.  But as Stephen Holmes has argued, 
quite the reverse may be true (Holmes 2009).  It is in extreme circumstances that rules and 
procedures may be most useful.  Formal channels offer scripts of action and coordination when 
thinking-time is short.  They keep objectives in view that might otherwise be lost in the scramble.  
They are enabling as much as constraining.  To the extent that there are cases where this does not 
hold, because the rules are dysfunctional or lacking, this should be seen as a design failure rather 
than an inevitable fact.  Informality is ultimately the expression of a choice. 
In their analysis of various forms of informal governance, Abbott and Faude (2020: 25-
6) acknowledge in passing that ‘these avenues raise thorny normative issues: they can reduce 
transparency and accountability, favor powerful actors, and produce relatively weak collective 
action. In positive terms, however, they may well enhance or protect cooperation.’  Treating the 
benefits of cooperation as potentially balancing the normative considerations seems misleading 
however.  One of the reasons transparency and accountability matter is to allow a wider public 
to shape which forms of cooperation are considered worth having.  Without the circumscription 
of rule with procedures, such matters are left to the discretion of the few, who in turn are more 
vulnerable to the pressure of private interests (recall the early-modern arguments for 
impersonality).  Even where they do not exploit the situation for self-serving ends, their criteria 
of the public good remain hard to identify and contest. 
What is also at stake is perceived legitimacy (Beetham 1991).  The basic principle of 
separating rulers from the offices of rule was crucial to the modern state’s capacity to achieve a 
measure of public acceptance.  It became possible to accept power while opposing those who 
wielded it: one could oppose the incumbents without opposing the system.  For rulers themselves 
this presented a threat.  If the King could be challenged in the name of the Crown (e.g. for ruling 
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irresponsibly and depleting its reserves), he could never be certain of his hold on power (van 
Apeldoorn 2020: 51).  But for the emerging political order it promised the possibility of radical 
reform within an association strong enough to sustain it.  Conversely, when power is exercised 
informally, the distinction between person and office becomes harder to sustain, and it becomes 
harder to abstract from the failings of individuals.  When populations have little reason to be 
confident in the structuring capacity of institutions, to oppose those in charge is necessarily to 
oppose the system as a whole.  Just as in the late medieval period, such authority is brittle.   
In a second line reasoning, one has to distinguish further between the dynamics in play.  
While a tendency towards informalisation is rightly criticised, it may be said a tendency towards 
personalisation has positive features, and is perhaps ultimately something to endorse.  Such a 
view relaxes the connection between the two identified in the state-building accounts we began 
with.  If power is prone to be concentrated in the hands of the few, it may be said that the 
appropriate goal is to allocate this formally, realigning power with institutional boundaries.  The 
elevation of key figures of the transnational sphere – including, in the EU, the presidents of the 
Commission, Council and ECB – makes sharper the delineation of power: what it needs is better 
codification. 
Especially in a context where ideas of nationhood and common identity cannot easily be 
invoked, a measure of personalisation may seem welcome.  Arguably it has positive implications 
for that third dimension of institutionalisation highlighted in accounts of state-formation – the 
integration of power into a larger social whole.  When governing authority is centred on key 
individuals, citizens have something to point at, to endorse or to criticise, enabling a better 
connection between rulers and ruled.  Whereas bureaucratic institutions tend to anonymise 
power, personalised arrangements foster the intelligibility of decision-making and create objects 
of scrutiny and allegiance.  Such arguments have a long pedigree in presidential systems, being 
advanced in the early US (Federalist Papers 70: 348-9).  They might seem all the more pertinent 
beyond the state, given the complexity of governing arrangements and the difficulty of attributing 
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responsibility.  Arguments to this effect have been made in relation to the EU Commission 
President and Council President (Schmitt, Hobolt and Popa 2015; Crum 2009), and could in 
principle extend to the ECB.   
While stronger codification would surely be welcome, consolidating this personalised 
model seems a dubious goal.  Worth emphasising is the importance not just of clarity on where 
power lies, but of its exposure to contestation.  More than just lines of responsibility, high offices 
should be expected to offer targets of influence, such that the goals informing policy can be 
disputed and shaped.  The more power retains a personalised basis, the more difficult this is likely 
to be.  Electoral mechanisms for selecting supranational leaders are undoubtedly part of the 
answer, as a way to further separate persons and offices, but are unlikely to suffice on their own.  
As the experience of contemporary presidential systems nationally suggests, personalised power 
tends to be judged mainly on questions of character, charisma and competence rather than the 
ends to which it is put (McAllister 2007).  A democratic rationale for depersonalisation is that it 
allows abstraction from the qualities of individual rulers to the ideas promoted by wider 
collectives.  When ideologies were developed by movements and parties of the left in the late-
nineteenth century, not only did this allow the integration of power into a social whole, but in 
such a way as to encourage principled contestation.  Embedding the offices of state in party 
politics meant embedding them in intermediary organisations that were themselves instances of 
depersonalised agency, and that contributed as such to making power more democratic.   
Fostering something similar transnationally has been notoriously difficult, but there are 
steps that might support it.  Parliamentarisation stands as the most logical route in the EU.  
Further linking the composition of the Commission to the outcome of European-Parliamentary 
elections, e.g. by requiring that Commissioners be MEPs, would be one plausible initiative 
(Lacey 2017: 221-3).  Rather than individuals selected on personal criteria, incumbents would 
then be the representatives of Europe-wide parties.  The same argument is applicable to central 
banking, where it would support moves to increase European-Parliamentary involvement in how 
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ECB officials interpret their mandate (de Boer and van ’t Klooster 2020: 26).  Depersonalising 
EU power in such ways would aid contestation of the ends it serves. 
Ultimately, however, the far-reaching question for transnational politics is how far the 
institutionalisation of power can be detached from the making of sovereignty.  The formalisation, 
depersonalisation and integration of power in the modern state, though always incomplete, was 
facilitated by hierarchies of authority that could be invoked when agents departed from script, 
and that allowed expectations to form about where power should lie.  The absence of such 
hierarchies transnationally both enables and encourages irregular forms of rule, especially in 
times of stress.  A functional constitution that embeds certain policy commitments is no substitute 
for a legal constitution that establishes constraints on action and identifies who has the authority 
to impose them.  This may suggest the desirability of restoring decision-making to the sovereign 
nation-state, as the most plausible context of efforts to renew the institutionalisation of power.  
But it could also be the rationale for a transformative approach, aimed at the construction of 
supranational sovereignty.  Demanding as such a constitutional project may be, the current of 





The making of modern authority was a project of institutionalising power.  Transnational political 
orders have often been seen as an extension of that project, even an effort to preserve it against 
threats.  The EU in particular has been cast as thoroughly modern in its attachment to rules and 
procedures, sometimes to the point of excess.  As this paper has sought to suggest, the EU of 
recent years is better approached as an arrangement that challenges the formalisation and de-
personalisation of power rather than one that marks their consolidation.  Here, as in other respects 
(Zielonka 2006), there is a ‘neo-medieval’ quality to the contemporary EU.  
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One of the insights from the tradition of studying emergency politics is that one learns 
from extreme situations about possibilities that are latent and long-standing.  The features we 
have examined – the use of informal forums, the concentration of power in individuals, the 
collaboration of leaders across institutional boundaries, and a reliance on personalised authority 
– are most pronounced in crisis conditions.  But rather than the shortcomings of a moment, they 
reveal vulnerabilities that are structural.  The extreme situation reveals what is possible, and sets 
precedents that can be reactivated.  Contra what tends to be written on informal governance, this 
should be seen as a disturbing prospect, since the looser the constraints on the exercise of power, 
the less confident one can be that it is put to good use. 
To chart the de-institutionalisation of power transnationally is not to suggest domestic 
contexts are spared it.  Increasingly the distinction between the two spheres is hard to draw.  
Alongside figures of the supranational world, the EU’s crisis politics has involved national 
leaders using transnational coordination to evade domestic constraints.  All are subject to 
influences that invite discretionary forms of decision-making, from the challenges of 
interdependence to the material pressures of economic power, from the weakening of 
representative ties to failings of institutional capacity.  But even if the working methods of 
transnational authorities are ultimately no worse than elsewhere, hopes that they might offer a 
positive contrast currently seem misguided.    
One may further note that many of the movements challenging supranational authority in 
recent years have been keen to accentuate these features.  Eurosceptics highlight the informality 
of rule as the basis for conspiracy theories.  The suggestion that leaders are surrounded by 
informal networks becomes the basis for denunciations centred on exposing a sham, and 
sometimes for efforts to discredit the principle of political representation more generally.  The 
de-institutionalisation of power at the supranational level thus presents an inviting target for 
critics at the national level.  Even should EU leaders seek to change course, stepping back from 
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the methods of recent years, they will be confronted by those intent on personalising authority as 
a way to discredit it.   
Developing transnational authority structures in a different direction is no easy thing 
therefore.  First though is to recognise the dynamics in play and why they matter.  De-
institutionalised power need not be arbitrary, but little prevents it becoming so.  Such problems 
can be anticipated especially in situations governed as emergencies, which offer opportunities 
and licence for irregular methods.  As emergencies come to preoccupy authorities at all levels, 
one should look to the transnational setting expecting not so much the further institutionalisation 
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